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“Basic research…provides scientific capital.  It creates the fund from which the practical applications of
knowledge must be drawn.”2
“So we discover in the administrative service one official who knows all that can be known about the control
of water-borne diseases, another who has at his fingertips the substance of all available information on wheat
rust, and another who cannot be ‘stumped’ on appropriations for the national park service.  These men are not
merely useful to legislators overwhelmed by the increasing flood of bills; they are simply indispensable.  They
are the government.”3
The second of these quotes seems almost quaint to a late
20th century reader familiar with the limited influence of
technological experts on the thinking of decisionmakers
who are concerned with a myriad of social and political
factors as well as basic scientific "facts.”  The first quote,
however, still resonates with many scientists and
policymakers.  We look to science for answers to deal
with problems that seem ever more complex and
threatening:  environmental threats,  global
competitiveness, crime, health hazards, education
failures, and so forth.  At the same time, however, we
have become cynical about scientific prescriptions for
social ills, especially when rival prescriptions are
presented in highly politicized public debates.
In this paper I offer some brief reflections on how
scientists and science program managers can better take
account of social priorities in the design of science
research agendas and the allocation of research budgets.4
For reasons discussed below, I think that more attention
to social priorities in the subject areas pursued and the
specific questions investigated is crucial for addressing
both scientific interests and social interests, though
scientific activities should not be entirely subordinate to
current perceptions of social needs.  I attempt to sketch
ways in which scientific methods can be used to inform
the setting of scientific priorities against the backdrop of
broader social concerns.5
THE CHALLENGE
Many observers would agree that social problems are
growing in both scale and complexity.6  Scale issues arise
because some potential threats, such as those stemming
from human impacts on the biosphere, now arise over
larger geographical areas (e.g., widespread deforestation
in some tropical areas, regional or global scale air
pollution) and have longer time durations (e.g., threats to
global biodiversity, persistent pollutants).  Complexity
grows as systemic concerns involve more interdependent
factors and require the attention of multiple disciplines.
A prime example is the evaluation of how human
activities affect biodiversity and other “ecosystem
services,” and how changes in these services in turn affect
human interests.7
The growing scale and complexity of social concerns
increase the demand for scientific input to devising
solutions, at least in largely technocratic societies like the
United States.  However, these same factors handicap the
application of scientific information to devising solutions.
Increases in the scale and complexity of social problems
pose a challenge to the articulation and consistent
application of social criteria for action (e.g., economic
efficiency, social equity, ecological integrity).  In short,
the determination of priorities for scientific inquiry
logically should be intimately connected to the
determination of social priorities.  In practice, this
5connection arises if only because social priorities
influence the allocation of financial resources for
scientific activities.  However, the nature of this
connection is often not well understood or articulated.  In
this situation, science increasingly is dragged into policy
debates which turn at least as much on competing value
systems as on scientific findings.  Scientific inquiry itself
becomes unavoidably politicized in this process, as
inevitable scientific uncertainties are exploited in
attempts for partisan gain.8
The other key element of the challenge is the increased
demand by the public for a more utilitarian accounting of
the fruits of scientific inquiry.  Faith in the view
expressed by the second quote at the beginning of the
paper, that the accumulation of scientific knowledge
inexorably will benefit humankind, has been shaken by
the failures of science to consistently deliver on this
promise and by the acceleration of competing demands
for public and private financial resources that might
otherwise support scientific activity.  Even when the right
subject areas are being investigated, the kinds of scientific
questions pursued may not fully address society’s relative
needs for knowledge.  For example, a better
understanding of climate change risks and response
options may be a priority, but responding to this priority
requires a better understanding of the potential impacts of
climate change and the possibilities for adaptation to
these impacts, not just a refined understanding of
atmospheric dynamics.
Byerly and Pielke (1995) discuss the growing social
distrust of the “reservoir of knowledge” theory of
scientific benefits and the growing demand by the public
for increased accountability on the part of the scientific
establishment.9  They conclude that the social contract
between the scientific establishment and the broader
public, as represented by society’s political institutions,
must be renegotiated.  In their view, science must
demonstrate greater democratic accountability to social
goals, which in turn will help win more sustained
political support for expenditures on scientific activity.
They recommend a national debate on the future of
science, addressing two key questions (Byerly and Pielke
1995, p. 1532):
1. In what ways does science contribute to the national
welfare?
2. How can science best be marshaled to assist in
addressing specific societal problems?
These two questions lead to two related corollary issues.
The first concerns the assessment of how science
contributes to social welfare.  The second is how
scientists and science leaders can interact with broader
processes through which social interests are articulated
and acted upon to make their own activities more aligned
with social interests, without giving up on the idea that
there is something distinctive about the pursuit of
scientific understanding.
SCIENCE, KNOWLEDGE, AND POLICY
In responding to the first of Byerly and Pielke’s
questions, determining what science has contributed to
the nation’s welfare, we immediately confront two
dilemmas.  First, there is no universal agreement on how
to assess national welfare.  Different definitions will have
implications for how science is valued.  Second, assessing
the contribution of science requires that we have some
measure of the input of science as well as the output, and
defining this input raises philosophical as well as
technical issues.
The common answer to the first dilemma, as Byerly and
Pielke suggest, is democratic accountability.  Granted that
we have no unambiguous, definitive measures of well-
being; in a democratic society we have processes to make
social determinations of the extent to which things are
satisfactory or wanting.  In practice, the process is less
simple.  The ongoing debate among social groups that put
different values on technical advance and maintenance of
pristine natural landscapes illustrates the point.  But these
debates reside within the larger society, not just within
the science establishment.  Scientists need to be aware of
the elements of these debates so that they can articulate
how they think scientific advance does contribute to the
achievement of different goals,10 but the resolution of
debates over values is not itself a scientific endeavor.
Regarding measuring the input of science, critics of
traditional ideas about the objectivity of scientific
knowledge, such as Jasinoff (1990) and Funtowicz and
Ravetz (1994), argue that what we call knowledge is in
fact an artifact of the various institutions society
establishes for legitimating assertions about what is an
acceptable description of “reality.”  In this view, even
peer review is a legitimating institution subject to various
kinds of manipulation, not an Olympian process for
deducing ultimate truth.  Following this line of argument
makes answering Byerly and Pielke’s question difficult,
since it is impossible to divorce what is defined as
6scientific knowledge from social values and conventions.
The critics have a point in arguing that there is no such
thing as ultimately objective reality – any attempt we
make to define our view of the world must rest on some
basic axioms that are themselves not testable.  But the
criticism of the traditional view of scientific knowledge
risks going too far in the other direction, denying that
there is anything special about what emerges from peer-
reviewed scientific inquiry and seeing the result of such
activity as just one more expression of a particular social
perspective.  It seems important to conceive of
subjectivity being a matter of degree.  Moreover, the
processes of scientific inquiry and expert peer review,
even though imperfect, do provide increased confidence
in the identification and explanation of observed patterns.
ESTABLISHING A STRONGER SCIENCE-
SOCIETY CONNECTION
I have argued that science can be seen as a specialized
skill that can generate a better understanding of social
problems for all parties to debates over social priorities
and values.  I also have argued that to function well in
practice, science needs to recognize and respond to those
debates rather than defining an independent agenda in a
vacuum.  To conclude the paper I turn to the other
question by Byerly and Pielke posed above, namely
assessing how science can best be marshaled to meet
social needs while still seeking to expand more
fundamental knowledge.
A key element, as those authors note, is a process of
social interaction between scientists and the broader
society that examines what science has contributed from
a number of perspectives.  Stakeholder peer review of
scientific accomplishments and agendas is a useful
complement to expert peer review.  Diverse groups
increasingly are involved in policy debates through multi-
criteria as well as multi-stakeholder processes, especially
with the devolution of some regulatory functions to states
and increased emphasis on public participation and
information activities.  One way stakeholder review of
scientific programs can be provided is for science
agencies and programs to have separate advisory bodies
that reflect stakeholder interests, as well as technically
oriented bodies capable of providing disciplinary or
multidisciplinary review.  The obverse of this process is
the need for scientists to increase their efforts toward
forthright education of stakeholders  regarding the value
of their science mission, especially in the case of more
fundamental research.  
A second key element is diversification of activities to
increase expected returns and reduce risks.  Just as
investing in only one security is imprudent, even if the
security seems to have an extraordinary return, society
should pursue a portfolio of diverse scientific activities
including more fundamental as well as applied research
rather than just picking a few apparent winners.  Who
precisely should make these investments (industry,
government, academia, and others) remains a complex
and much-debated question, one that ultimately will be
settled through a resolution of competing stakeholder
interests like any other policy issue, but this does not alter
the basic conclusion about the value of diversification.
The argument in favor of social interaction in the
previous paragraph implies that both scientific experts
and the broader public have a role to play in these
determinations.
A third key element in more strongly connecting science
to social interests involves an internal discipline for
setting priorities.  Just as scientists must make choices in
what types of knowledge they may pursue, scientific
agencies and programs face difficult tradeoffs in directing
attention to different social goals (for example, among
environmental concerns or between economic and
environmental objectives).  Selectivity is needed in
dealing with currently pressing issues without losing
track of the importance of supporting more fundamental
research that may have a less evident payoff.  
To choose how to focus resources, science program
managers can use a model based on the value of
information.  This model directs attention to where
increased knowledge would have the greatest potential
impacts on decisions.  Examples of the questions brought
to the fore by this approach include:  How is a proposed
analysis of scientific phenomena linked to social values
and incentives?  Are the areas of greatest scientific
uncertainty also those areas where the value of improved
knowledge is highest?  What do decisionmakers need –
better facts, better knowledge of mechanisms, better
knowledge of behavioral levers?  How are the risks,
benefits, and costs distributed among different groups and
across time?
An example of this kind of inquiry, as already suggested,
is in the area of climate change.  It is not enough to better
understand atmospheric dynamics.  It may be more
valuable to increase understanding of how climate change
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could affect human health, and even more valuable still,
to  better understand how an improved public health and
social service infrastructure might reduce these risks.  To
serve an increasingly diverse set of constituencies
interested in such complex problems, there is a growing
need for a capacity to conduct scientifically respectable
but relatively quick “what if” scenario analyses as well as
more complex multifaceted assessments.
A final crucial element in the process of connecting
science and social values is iterative shared learning.
Social values extant at any moment in time depend on the
vast and idiosyncratic pools of knowledge and experience
possessed by different members of society.  I have argued
that scientific inquiry should be informed by this
knowledge and experience in responding to social
priorities.  At the same time, scientific inquiry alters
knowledge and changes our experience of the world,
thereby altering values and priorities.11  This
interdependence heightens the apparent tension between
science as a world apart and science as a tool for social
problem-solving, and it underscores the importance for
both science and the public at large that scientific
endeavors be better connected to the society in which the
endeavors are carried out.
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ENDNOTES:
83. Leonard White (1926), quoted in Jasanoff (1990, p. 10).
4.  In this paper I use the term “science” very broadly to refer to physical, biological, and social science
fields.
5.  In this paper I do not attempt to address the question of how scientific knowledge is or should be used
to help resolve specific social policy controversies involving complex and uncertain cause-effect
relationships, such as those arising in the regulation of environmental hazards.  Essentially I believe
that scientific analysis (in the broad sense, including the social sciences) should play a vital part in
these processes, but that scientific analysis alone cannot provide definitive answers.  For further
discussion of this issue see National Research Council (1994, 1996) and (specifically on the role of
economic analysis) Kopp, Krupnick, and Toman (1997) and Toman (1998).
6. For further discussion of this see Norton and Toman (1997) and references therein.
7. The papers in Simpson and Christensen (1997) discuss these complications in detail.
8. For a summary of these aspects of the science/policy nexus, see for example Jasanoff (1990) and
references cited therein.
9. Byerly and Pielke note that the reservoir of knowledge concept largely is a post-World War II idea;
prior to that, government policy expected more in the way of immediately tangible benefits from
science. 
10. In practice this task is itself extremely difficult, given the uncertainty surrounding any
contemporaneous cause-effect relationships involving specific scientific advances and social progress.
11. See Norton and Toman (1997) and references therein for discussion of this approach in the context of
environmental impacts.
